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By Mohamed A. EI-Khawas
The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
was created in 1963 at a time when the
philosophy of non-violence was bankrupt
in Southern Africa. Following decades of
non-violent protest efforts, tactics shifted
toward revolutionary models, largely in
response to the determined refusal of the
remaining colonial and settler regimes
to relinquish their control over Southern
Africa- including Angola, Guinea (Bis-
sau), Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe
(Rhodesia) and South Africa (Azania).
Several incidents of repressive actions
by the colonial and settler governments
served as turning points for tactical think-
ing; in particular the banning of political
parties and the detaining of nationalist
leaders not only forced some African
leaders to flee their countries but also
prodded them toward revolutionary mili-
tancy. Subsequently, in exile they be-
As early as 1963, the OAU member
states agreed on the following: to sever
diplomatic and consular relations with
Portugal and South Africa; to impose
economic boycott against them; and to
send a delegation to the United Nations
Security Counci I in New York to speak on
behalf of all African states.' Additionally,
they promised to coordinate and intensify
their efforts to put an end to colonialism
and racism. Such a unified policy was a
giant step in the direction of carrying out
their diplomatic offenses in the halls of
the UN. and international conferences.
The new organization gave an impetus
to move away from moderation and ac-
commodation to confrontation and mili-
tancy. It instructed African representatives
in New York to press for the UN. adoption
of the severest possible measures against
Portugal, South Africa-and later Rhode-
sia-as a demonstration of their solidarity
and singleness of purpose. They openly
expressed dissatisfaction with the way
the UN. has handled colonialism and
apartheid, since the policy of persuasion
merely encouraged the Lisbon and Pre-
toria governments to intensify their re-
pressive policies in Africa." The OAU in-
sisted that the time for appeasement was
over and that the UN. must take forcible
measures to induce changes.
From 1964 on, the OAU began to focus
its attention on Portugal's NATO allies,
and South Afica's major trading partners
- the Western European countries, the
U. S. and Japan-who represented major
obstacles to the liberation struggle. In
1965 and 1967, the African representa-
tives had so effectively argued this view-
point about the detrimental impact of the
countries continuing economic, diplo-
matic and military relations with Lisbon
and Pretoria that this view was endorsed
by the UN. General Assembly.'
Moreover, the OAU leaders went to
Europe, the U. S. and Japan to exert pres-
sure on those countries aiding South
Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia for several
reasons: they had substantially increased
the volume of trade and investment in
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came the primary forces behind the for-
mation of national liberation movements.
(See list on page 18.)
An early sign of the shift in the African
view point came in 1961 when the Mani-
festo of the African National Congress
(ANC) stated: "The time comes in the life
of any nation when there remain only two
choices-submit or fight. That time has
now come ... We shall not submit. and we
have no choice but to hit back by all
means in our power in defence of our
people, our future and our freedom." 1
The same year, the All-African Peoples
Conference in Cairo endorsed "the neces-
sity ... to resort to force in order to liqui-
date colonialism." 2 A year later, the Pan-
African Freedom Movement of East and
Central Africa (PAFMECSA), which had
previously championed non-violence.'
endorsed the ANC call to arms and ex-
panded its membership to include the
Southern African liberation movements
(PAFMECSA).
It was in this atmosphere that the OAU
was formed in order to transform national
liberation struggle from regional to con-
tinental wide efforts. The result was the
dissolution of PAFMESCA and the transfer
of its functions and funds to the OAU,
which proceeded immediately to set up a
mechanism by which African and non-
African states could provide the various
liberation movements with military train-
ing, equipment and financing to wage
armed struggle against colonial and set-
tler regimes.
Diplomatic Efforts
The immediate results of the creation of
the OAU were: to give legitimacy to the
liberation struggle against racism and
colonialism in Africa; to provide indepen-
dent African states with a machinery to
supply the liberation movements with
material and other assistance needed to
wage their armed struggles; to set in mo-
tion a unified African policy toward colo-
nial and settler regimes in Africa; and to
solicit international support for the libera-
tion efforts in Southern Africa.
h Africa; West Germany, the Nether-
s and later the U. S. had resumed
=ade with Rhodesia in violation of the
. sanctions; 7 and Portugal had con-
- ued to use NATOweapons in Africa in
- lation of the treaty obi igations. For
tance, M. Ould Oaddah, then chairman
- the OAU, visited 12 European capitals
= Tokyo in 1972 to appeal to South
-- ica's trading partners to impose eco-
-xxnic boycott and to urge NATOmember
::ountries to prevent Portugal from using
TO weapons in its African wars. He
= 0 solicited their support for the libera-
struggles in Southern Africa. But the
= peals were ignored as most nations-
::xluding Britain, U.S.A.,Canada, France
= West Germany-continued to invest
- South Africa, trade with Rhodesia and
- nore Portugal's usage of NATO weap-
::IlS in Africa. Only Turkey and Scandi-
'lavian countries agreed to assist the lib-
ation movements through the OAU.s In
m, these missions abroad produced
ry limited results.
Tn-the following years, the OAU efforts
re directed more towards those coun-
ies directly or indirectly aiding colonial
= d settler regimes in Southern Africa-
countries whose policies had placed the
colonial and settler regimes in a much
oetter position to withstand the economic
= d diplomatic sanctions that had been
=nposed by African and mostThird World
.ations.
It shouId be noted that the OAU was
ited to press for what amounted to a
JUblic censure of several important
itOrld powers for their failure to impose
iplomatic and economic boycotts
qjainst South Africa, Portugal and Rho-
esia. The organization reached such a
oosition, however, only as an end result
f several years of effort ranging from
::emperate and relatively mild strategies
:0 ever more firm and insistent measures
as colonial and settler regimes had
increasingly reinforced their repressive
oolicies.
Condemnation of big powers definitely
epresented a strong position, and the
strength and the determination of the
OAU is demonstrated well by its abi lity to
receive the UN. General Assembly's en-
dorsement for the African stance. It was
due to such persistent efforts that the
General Assembly declared in 1965 that
colonialism and apartheid were both a
threat to peace and crime against human-
ity. It also invited all states, in coopera-
tion with the OAU, to provide material and
moral assistance to liberation movements
and requested the UN. specialized agen-
cies to increase theirassistance to African
retuqees.?
Sources of Aid
The bulk of assistance to the liberation
movements has come from independent
African states, in the form of money, arms
and training facilities. This support, a
natural psychological reaction to long
years of colonial bondage, is the corner-
stone of the liberation strugg les in South-
ern Africa. Leaders of independent Afri-
can states-radical, moderate and con-
servative alike-have felt that their own
national independence is not complete
"unless all Africans are free ... We must
align and identify ourselves with all as-
pects of their struggle." 10
It was in this atmosphere of determina-
tion that, in 1963, the newly created
Organization of African Unity called for
"eliminating colonialism altogether" 11
and committed its member states to the
"urgent necessity of coordinating and in-
tensifying their efforts to accelerate the
unconditional attainment of national inde-
pendence by all African territories sti II
under foreign domination." 12
The organization took measures to en-
sure the efficiency of its campaign against
colonialism and for liberation. For ex-
ample, it established a Liberation Com-
mittee to accomplish the following: to co-
ordinate material and financial support
sent to the liberation movements from in-
dividual African states and from abroad;
to render recognition and financial as-
sistance to selected revolutionary move-
ments; to reconcile differences among
rival insurgent organizations in an attempt 17
to form united fronts; to faci litate the forma-
tion of revolutionary alliances across na-
tional boundaries; and to use diplomacy
to publicize their struggle in international
organizations and conferences."
Among the African governments that
positively responded to the OAU's call to
create a Liberation Fund were Algeria,
Guinea and Tanzania. A total of $336,000
was made avai lable immediately. In addi-
tion, Cameroon, Nigeria and Uganda
promised another $436,000.14 Within a
year, the majority of African states had
completed their pledges and only two
countries had fallen behind in their pay-
ments.> The second year, however, sev-
eral governments (24 out of 30) became
delinquent in their payments."
Such uneven financing of the Liberation
Fund did significantly limit the Fund's ef-
fectiveness in helping the liberation
movements. Because the majority of in-
dependent African states insisted that
payments to the fund be made voluntari Iy,
the fund depended on the willingness
each year of those governments to make
contributions. There wasa short-lived at-
tempt in 1964 to specify an obligatory
minimum sum to be paid annually by
each independent African state, unti I a
scale of assessment couId be worked out,
but this proposal was rejected and the
OAU continued to avoid coercive meas-
ures against delinquent member states.
Two years later, the OAU conducted an
open discussion of the liberation budget,
but rejected a motion by Tanzania to set
up a fixed budget for the Liberation Com-
mittee as a means of stabilizing the fund-
ing of the liberation struggles. Meanwhile,
the majority of independent states sti II re-
fused to commit themselves to regular an-
nual payments to the Liberation Fund.'?
The OAU's persistent financial difficul-
ties had considerably weakened its abil-
ity to influence the directions of the libera-
tion struggles. Liberation movements,
which had received little or no financial
assistance from the Liberation Committee,
18 continued to express dissatisfaction with
the OAU aid program. And several na-
tionalist leaders went West and East in
their search for extemal assistance, par-
ticularly for arms and personnel to teach
guerrilla warfare tactics. Basil Davidson
reported in 1971 that "all movements
have tried repeatedly to secure aid from
Western sources and all stress their non-
aligned posture. So far-aside from aid in
medical and other stores collected by
unofficial groups in half a dozen Western
countries, and now from the Council of
Churches-they have found a response
only in Sweden." 18
Under these circumstances, revolution-
ary leaders had no option but to seek as-
sistance from the Eastern bloc. Because
of Cold War competition, the Soviet Union,
China, Cuba, and Eastern Europe ex-
tended material and other forms of assist-
ance to revolutionary groups in Africa. But
when the Sino-Soviet split took place, Pe-
king became less interested in courting
revolutionary groups inAfrica and insisted
that liberation movements must choose
between Moscow and Peking.19
Dialogue With South Africa
Time had shown that the OAU certainly
over-estimated its ability to finance the
armed struggles in Southern Africa. Its
liberation efforts were hampered on the
one hand by rivalry among revolutionary
leadership, internal strife and violent
inter-party clashes, and on the other hand,
by the failure of some African states to
make regular annual contributions to the
Liberation Fund. By the end of the 1960s,
the OAU was forced to re-assess its strat-
egy toward the liberation -of Southern
Africa in the face of substantial increases
in military budgets and in close military
cooperation among SouthAfrica, Portugal
and Rhodesia.
In response, the OAU Summit in Addis
Ababa in September 1969 endorsed the
Lusaka Manifesto which stated that:
On the objective of liberation ... We
have always preferred and we still pre-
fer, to achieve it without physical vio-
lence. We would prefer to negotiate
rather than destroy. ... If peaceful prog-
ress to emancipation were possible, or
if changed circumstances were to
make it possible in the future, we would
urge our brothers in the resistance
movements to use peaceful methods of
struggle even at the cost of some com-
promise on the timing of change20
This endorsement meant that the OAU
had committed itself to encourage the
liberation movements to cooperate in the
mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power
if the minority regimes would accept the
principle of self-determination. This new
attitude led President Houphouet-Boigny
of the Ivory Coast in 1970 to talk of d ia-
logue with South Africa. He was sup-
ported by Malagasy, Malawi, Rwanda,
Uganda, Gabon, Chad and Dahomey for
the following reasons:
• The armed struggle has failed ...
• The African states do not possess the
military and economic resources to chal-
lenge South Africa decisively.
• Meanwhile, South Africa feeling itself
threatened may be incited into taking the
offensive.
• The policy of political and cultural iso-
lation will not eliminate apartheid. Instead,
"isolation only seems to consolidate na-
tional unity and increase national resolve
to maintain and defend the regime."
• The trade embargo cannot succeed.
Many countries, including some African
countries, have stated that they must con-
tinue to trade with South Africa.
• There are moderate forces within
South Africa, Black and white, with whom
contact should be made ...
• The fact that African states are holding
a dialogue with the SouthAfrican Govern-
ment will encourage moderate white
opinion and influential business pressure
groups to seek an accord with the Black
majority for the purpose of Changing the
apartheid policies."
These arguments were rejected by the
majority of the OAU member states who




Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPU
Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio/Frente
Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (GRAE/FNLA)
Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de
Angola (UNITA)
GUINEA (BISSAU):
Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine
e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)
Frente para a Libertacao e Independencia da
Guine Portuguesa (FLING)
MOZAMBIQUE:
Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELlMO)
Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique (COREMO)
ZIMBABWE (RHODESIA):
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLlZI)
Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA)
Patriotic Front (ZANU & ZAPU)
United African National Congress (UANC)
AZANIA (SOUTH AFRICA):
African National Congress (ANC)
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)
Unity Movement
NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA):
South West Africa National Union (SWANU)
South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)
place before SouthAfrica's acceptance to
abandon the principles of apartheid. They
felt that Pretoria was motivated to make
such propositions because:
• She wishes to neutralize the liberation
movements.
• She is trying to break out of the in-
creasing isolation from which she is be-
ginning to suffer.
• She seeks to gain respectability in the
eyes of the world.
• Her govemment must continue to re-
assure the white supporters in the coun-
try that it can guarantee them protection.
• Her govemment must continue to re-
assure foreign investors that their assets
are safe and will remain safe.
• South Africa is seeking to diffuse the
hostility against her so that she can build
a market in Africa to meet the needs of an
economy which is beginning to feel the
strain of crampness.s?
Although the opponents to dialogue were
able to receive the endorsement of the
OAU, the controversy had split African
solidarity against colonialism and racial
:siscrimination in Southem Africa. For ex-
- pie, Ghana, Ethiopia, Mali, Equatorial
uuinea and Liberia thought that "dia-
ogue and armed pressures are not nece-
sarily incompatible." 23
The Impact of OAU's Role
The OAU has attempted to playa signifi-
cant role in the liberation struggles in
SouthernAfrica because wars of liberation
could not be successfully launched with-
out external assistance. Aside from giving
eqitirnacy to the armed strugg Ie,the OAU
aas conducted diplomatic campaigns to
isolate South Africa, Portugal and Rho-
esia. Although its efforts have not always
met with success, it has kept these issues
alive and has largely influenced decisions
of international bodies. It did not shy from
riticizing some big power nations for fai I-
re to give support to the African political
and economic strategy against colonial
and settler regimes in Southern Africa. In
addition, it expressed concern over the
ecisions by Western Europe, the U.S.A.
and Japan to continue trade and invest-
ent in South Africa.
The OAU kept a sharp eye on interna-
ional events in searching for opportuni-
ies that might advance its cause. The
rganization took advantage of the 1973
iddle Eastwar and called upon the Arab
oil-producing nations "to extend the oi I
smbarqo to South Africa, Portugal and
odesia" until they capitulate. In re-
sponse, the Arab governments endorsed
~ OAU call and imposed oil embargo
a.gainst the white minority regimes in
::J()uthernAfrica; they also promised to
ovide pol itical and material assistance
the liberation rnovernents.>
The creation of the OAU Liberation Com-
" ee has provided valuable assistance
the liberation struggles in Southern
-rrica. The committee has put pressure on
ependent African states to contribute
~ularly to the eradication of colonialism
= racism from that region, and has pro-
- ed a convenient mechanism for chan-
ling aid from abroad to the liberation
movements. Although the OAU has been
widely criticized for its limited financial
support, it has steadily managed to sus-
tain the struggle in various countries in the
area for several years. Because of finan-
cial constraint and the fai lure of some Afri-
can governments to make regular contri-
butions to the Liberation Fund, the OAU
has been unable to allocate adequate
funding for the liberation struggles in
Southern Africa. It has been compelled to
withhold recognition from some move-
ments and to increase financial alloca-
tions to others, particularly to those groups
which have demonstrated military suc-
cesses against their enemies. In the late
1960s, the OAU considerably increased
budgetary allocations to both the PAIGC
and the FRELIMOwhen their mi litary cam-
paigns were intensified against Portugal
inside Guinea (Bissau) and Mozambique,
respectively. Such a policy was practical
since the eviction of Portuguese colonial-
ism from SouthernAfrica has already been
completed. With the liberation of these
former Portuguese territories, now the
OAU might be in a better position to allo-
cate more funds and to devote more time
to the liberation of Namibia, Rhodesia and
South Africa.
The OAU hasworked hard since 1963to
persuade rival groups from the same
country to resolve their differences and to
coordinate their military and political ac-
tivities against their common enemy. Al-
though it has not always been able to
achieve its objectives, it has managed to
bring about short-Iived agreements among
revolutionary leaders.
If the results obtained by the OAU have
been modest, this is because several in-
dependent African states have negatively
responded to the liberation call. A number
of states have been in arrears and have
ignored repeated appeals by the OAU to
bring their payments up to date. Therefore,
the OAU cannot be blamed for its fai lure
to provide substantial assistance to the
liberation struggles in Southern Africa
since it is merely a reflection of the inter-
est and support of its member states. D
Mohamed A. EI-Khawas, Ph.D., is professor of history 19
at the University of the District of Columbia.
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